The first call a victim makes about authorised push payment fraud sets up almost everything that follows. The claim gets logged in the bank’s systems, the investigator picks it up a day or two later, and the reimbursement decision depends on what the frontline agent captured in those first few minutes. Since the mandatory reimbursement rules came into force in October 2024, that first call is no longer just a service interaction. It’s the opening of a regulatory process with a 48-hour clock and a payable outcome at the end.
I’ve spent the last couple of years with banks and specialist banking call center services teams working out how to handle the volume this creates, and the consistent story is that the first-call protocols most banks had before 2024 are not fit for the new regime. The old scripts captured the basics for an investigation that could run for weeks. The new rules require evidence captured in the first conversation that supports or denies reimbursement within 48 hours of the claim. That’s a different operational workflow, and most teams only partially shifted.
- What the Reimbursement Rules Changed for Authorised Push Payment Fraud
- The Evidence First-Call Agents Need to Capture Properly
- Why Authorised Push Payment Fraud Calls Require Specialist Training
- The 48-Hour Clock and What It Means for Operational Design
- How Authorised Push Payment Fraud Volumes Are Shifting Through 2026
- Keep Reading Customer Experience Online for More Banking Insights
- Authorised Push Payment Fraud FAQ: Five Questions Banks Ask
What the Reimbursement Rules Changed for Authorised Push Payment Fraud
The headline change is that authorised push payment fraud victims are now entitled to reimbursement up to £85,000 per claim, split equally between the sending and receiving banks. The PSR’s announcement of the new reimbursement requirement when it came into force made clear this is a shift from exception-based goodwill payouts to a presumption of reimbursement unless the customer meets a defined threshold for gross negligence. The burden of proof sits with the banks, not the victim, and the standard they have to meet is high.
That burden shift matters operationally because every reimbursement decision has to be defensible after the fact. The investigator looking at the file a week later needs enough evidence to either reimburse or deny, and if the frontline notes don’t contain the right detail, the default decision will be reimbursement because that’s where the burden of proof lands. Banks whose first-call notes still look like 2022-era free text are quietly paying out claims they could have reasonably declined. The ones who’ve rebuilt their protocols are capturing the specific evidence the new rules require.
The Evidence First-Call Agents Need to Capture Properly
The evidence set required for defensible decisions on authorised push payment fraud claims has become specific enough that it belongs on a structured form, not in a free-text note. The customer’s version of events in their own words. The communication channel the fraudster used (phone, text, email, social media, in-person). Whether any payment warnings were shown and ignored, and if so which specific warnings. The time between the customer first being contacted and the payment being authorised. Whether the customer was prompted to move money by a sense of urgency, which is a defining feature of impersonation scams.
Capturing that structured evidence in a traumatic conversation requires a different agent profile and a different training programme than typical banking service work. Victims of impersonation fraud are often distressed, embarrassed, and worried about accusations of complicity in the fraud. Pushing through a structured intake form in that state requires empathy skills most call centres underinvest in, because the quality of the evidence depends on the quality of the conversation. Rushed intake produces thin notes. Thin notes produce indefensible decisions. Indefensible decisions mean the bank reimburses when it shouldn’t have.
Why Authorised Push Payment Fraud Calls Require Specialist Training
Training on these three areas typically runs 15 to 20 hours spread over two to three weeks for new agents, with ongoing refresher sessions as scam patterns shift. The investment is modest relative to the exposure. One industry report found that 88% of money lost to APP scams was reimbursed under the new scheme in its first year, so the cost of thin intake is real money moving through the reimbursement pool. Banks with specialist teams typically report lower reimbursement rates on comparable claim volumes, which traces back to better first-call evidence rather than to differences in customer behaviour.
Call recording and quality assurance workflows need to adapt too for authorised push payment fraud intake, because the evidence captured in the call becomes part of the regulatory record rather than just an internal service metric. QA reviewers on these calls are checking for empathy, correct scam-type identification, and the completeness of the structured intake, not for the usual metrics around hold time or script adherence. The scoring rubric has to be rewritten specifically for this queue, and the reviewers themselves usually need the same specialist training as the frontline agents to score the calls accurately. Banks who try to QA this queue through their general QA team usually find the scores drift away from the regulatory requirements over time.
The 48-Hour Clock and What It Means for Operational Design
The 48-hour investigation window is the operational constraint that reshapes everything about authorised push payment fraud intake. The receiving bank has to be contacted, the account activity has to be reviewed, the sending bank has to make its decision, and the customer has to be informed, all within two working days. That’s achievable only if the first call captured the evidence an investigator needs without going back to the customer for clarification, because every clarification call eats hours against the clock and tests the customer’s patience in a situation where patience is already in short supply.
Banks who’ve designed properly for the clock usually run a dedicated APP fraud queue with named investigators who handle the file end-to-end rather than passing it between generalist fraud teams. That specialisation shortens the investigation cycle meaningfully. It also lets the investigator develop a working knowledge of the specific scam patterns circulating that quarter, which pays off because scammers rotate tactics faster than general fraud teams can keep up with. Specialist queues outperform generalist ones consistently on both speed and accuracy.

How Authorised Push Payment Fraud Volumes Are Shifting Through 2026
The volume shape for authorised push payment fraud has been shifting in ways that affect staffing planning. Impersonation scams, where the fraudster poses as the bank, a police officer, or HMRC, have been the dominant category since the reimbursement scheme came in, but purchase scams have grown rapidly through 2026 as fraudsters shift to lower-value, higher-volume attacks. The average claim size has fallen while total claim volume has risen, which changes the staffing model because thousands of small claims consume more agent time than hundreds of large ones at equal pound totals.
Seasonal patterns matter too. Volumes rise sharply from mid-November through January, partly because Christmas purchase scams and partly because impersonation fraudsters know Q4 is when consumer attention is divided. Banks who staff APP fraud intake flat across the year routinely underperform in Q4 and overshoot in Q2. The right pattern is a seasonal ramp that mirrors the broader fraud curve, which looks more like a retail Golden Quarter plan than a traditional banking rota. For teams building this capacity for the first time, the companion piece on outsourcing for banks covers the vendor-selection side of the decision.
Keep Reading Customer Experience Online for More Banking Insights
If you’re building or refreshing your authorised push payment fraud operations ahead of the 2026 peak, there’s more at Customer Experience Online on specialist banking queues, regulatory operations, and the first-call protocols that actually hold up when an investigator reviews them a week later. The regulatory landscape here is going to keep moving, and the operational implications are specific enough that generic banking service playbooks don’t cover them properly.
The banks who get this right usually share a few habits. A dedicated intake queue handles these cases, supported by specialist training. Instead of relying on free text, the process captures structured evidence through a form. Seasonal staffing then allows the team to adjust capacity as demand changes. And they measure the reimbursement rate on their own claims against industry benchmarks, so a drift in decision quality gets caught early rather than at the end of a quarterly reporting cycle. Come read the detail before the next regulatory review, because the operational investments that look expensive in isolation almost always pay back through lower reimbursement outflows and a stronger supervisory position when the FCA runs its next thematic exercise.
Authorised Push Payment Fraud FAQ: Five Questions Banks Ask
£85,000 per claim, split equally between the sending and receiving banks. Claims above that cap can be reimbursed on a goodwill basis but aren’t required under the mandatory scheme. Most claims fall well below the cap.
48 hours from the claim being logged in most cases, with limited extensions available for complex claims. The clock is tight enough that first-call evidence capture determines whether the window is achievable.
Yes, but the standard is gross negligence by the customer, and the burden of proof sits with the bank. Denials require specific, documented evidence that the customer ignored a warning or acted recklessly beyond ordinary carelessness.
Yes, in almost every case. Specialist queues produce better evidence, faster investigation cycles, and more defensible decisions. The training investment is modest relative to the reimbursement exposure.
Volumes rise sharply from mid-November through January as purchase scams and impersonation fraud both peak around the holiday period. Flat annual staffing underperforms a seasonal ramp consistently.

Offshore BPO analyst covering the UK, South Africa, and the Philippines. Writing on outsourcing strategy, compliance, and CX operations across all three markets — from British buyers to offshore operators.




